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Abstract
We take an asset pricing approach to model the funding advantage of Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In order to replicate some stylized facts, we extend a referenced model to incor-
porate defaultability of mortgage agencies. The model implies that the direct
eﬀect from having a government guarantee results in a funding advantage of
21 bp. This indicates that the funding advantage of 40 bps estimated in the
literature may be a bad proxy for the dollar value of the liability to the govern-
ment. For a GSE, which explicitly takes a guarantee into account, the funding
advantage is passed through to mortgagors. If not, as much as 75% of the
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11 Introduction
Do the shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac beneﬁtf r o mt h et i g h tl i n k
with the US government? Through an implicit subsidy, are they a liability to the
government? Does the implicit subsidy beneﬁt mortgagors? Is there an implicit
subsidy at all? Irrespective of the stance on these issues, it is well known that GSEs
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) enjoy certain beneﬁts and have to adhere
to certain restrictions due to their special relation to the government.
In the literature, there are a range of controversies regarding the existence of the
GSEs, the beneﬁts from having them and the potential dangers. The issues concern
the relative funding advantage the GSEs seem to have and to what extent, if any, this
advantage results in lower mortgage rates. Other aspects concern the more indirect
eﬀects such as the ability to increase home ownership for low-to-middle income (LMI)
households and creation of a stable mortgage market.
Despite a great degree of disagreement, many papers on these issues seem to have
in common that they rely solely on econometric results. Only few papers deal with
these questions theoretically and unsurprisingly, the authors who ﬁnd that the GSEs
do a bad job are in favor of privatizing them, and those who ﬁn dt h e yd oag o o dj o b
do not want anything to change.
Passmore (2003), CBO (2001) and Blinder, Flannery & Kamihachi (2004) gen-
erally ﬁnd the funding advantage (the ability to issue MBSs cheaper because of the
status as GSE) to be in the range of 30 to 40 bp. For the underlying mortgages,
there generally is a larger disagreement concerning the eﬀect from being conforming
and thereby available for purchase by GSEs. Passmore (2003) estimates that the
conforming-non-conforming spread (the mortgage spread from now on) is between
15 to 18 bp of which only 7 bp can be attributed to being a GSE. Blinder et al.
(2004) criticize the approach in Passmore (2003), and they instead ﬁnd the mortgage
spread to be between 26 to 29 bp of which 19 bp is attributable to being a GSE.
Considering the empirical evidence also found in CBO (2001), McKenzie (2002) and
Passmore, Sparks & Ingpen (2002), the mortgage spread of Blinder et al. (2004) ap-
pears reasonable. Blinder et al. (2004), however, pose the question of why a funding
advantage should result in a reduced mortgage spread in the ﬁrst place. Passmore
et al. (2002) argue that because the government guarantee allows GSEs to sell bonds
without any additional credit enhancement, mutual competition between them drives
down mortgage rates.
The potential eﬀect from GSEs is not only limited to lower mortgage rates. Bostic
& Surette (2001) ﬁnd that from 1989 to 1998 home ownership has increased. The
increase occurs while there is a general decline in disparity between diﬀerent groups,
which the authors attribute to a change in the mortgage markets, and see this as an
indication that regulation works. In contrast, Frame & White (2004) and references
therein claim that the GSEs do not do a good job in improving LMI homeownership.
In another line of argument, Peek & Wilcox (2003) ﬁnd that GSEs enhance the
2stability of the mortgage market in the sense that they are able to reduce interest
rate volatility through a general pro-cyclical behavior.
This paper contributes to the literature by examining the eﬀects of a potential
government guarantee in an asset-pricing framework. We believe that this paper
provides the ﬁrst asset-pricing approach to understand funding advantages and mort-
gagor beneﬁts. Within the posed framework, we are able to explain how a government
guarantee in itself can foster a stable mortgage market. We extend a standard refer-
enced model (Kau, Keenan, Muller & Epperson (1992), Schwartz & Torous (1992) and
subsequently used in Svenstrup & Willemann (2005)) to allow for the possibility of
the default of an agency. To model this, we need to account for the path-dependency
in the accumulated loss due to mortgagor default. We accomplish this through the
augmented state variable approach as in Hull & White (1993). We consider diﬀerent
types of agencies with and without a guarantee and compare par coupon rates. This
e n a b l e su st oe x a m i n et h ee ﬀect from solely having a government guarantee without
any other eﬀect pertaining to GSEs.
Within our framework, we are able to replicate some stylized facts of GSEs. We
focus solely on the eﬀects of the government guarantee: should a GSE get into ﬁ-
nancial problems due to a mushrooming of mortgagor defaults, the government will
intervene. Further, we focus only on the risk of GSEs related to their mortgage secu-
ritization business. We disregard the retained portfolios of the GSEs, which according
to Jaﬀee (2003) constitute roughly 75% of F&F proﬁts in 2001.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect from having such a guarantee can result in a funding
advantage of 21 bp, which is signiﬁcantly lower than the generally accepted level of
30 to 40 bp. However, the 21 bp we ﬁnd are from the pure eﬀect of the guarantee: as
described in Frame & White (2004), the GSEs have other beneﬁts, which can increase
the funding advantage. Our present framework does not capture these aspects. This
is actually a strength more than a weakness of our analysis: It means that the funding
advantage discussed in the literature and used as a proxy for a dollar value of the
liability to the government, may be severely over estimated: Our ﬁndings indicate
that out of the real world funding advantage of up to 40 bps, only half of that is
likely to be attributable to the guarantee, and thus the liability of the government.
The remaining funding advantage must then be due to the other beneﬁts of GSEs as
described in Frame & White (2004).
Modeling an agency with a government guarantee where the agency sees the guar-
antee as a cap on potential losses, all beneﬁts from the funding advantage are passed
through. If we compare this to a base case GSE that has mortgage rates that does
not reﬂect a guarantee, then we can measure the potential size of the beneﬁtt os h a r e -
holders. Using two arguments, we ﬁnd that out of a funding advantage of 21 bp as
much as 16 bp is retained by the agency, if mortgage rates are not set to reﬂect the
cap on potential losses. This means that as much as 76 % of the funding advantage,
which ideally belongs to the taxpayers, goes to the shareholders.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the guarantee in itself can create a stable mortgage market.
3A GSE making use of the guarantee will ceteris paribus oﬀer mortgage rates, which
are considerably less sensitive to changes in important factors such as the house-price
volatility.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce
the model setup, section 3 discusses numerical results while section 4 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
In this section, we introduce the modeling framework. To ﬁx concepts, we introduce
the contractual setup in section 2.1. We extend a standard referenced model for
mortgage backed bonds as seen in Kau et al. (1992), Schwartz & Torous (1992) and
subsequently used in Svenstrup & Willemann (2005). We review this model in section
2.2. Bond prices in these models are calculated numerically by using ﬁnite diﬀerence
methods. However, with this type of solution method, we cannot directly model the
default of an agency since the accumulated loss of mortgage defaults, which can drive
the agency into default, is by nature path-dependent. Nevertheless, in section 2.3 we
show how we can extend the solution method to allow for a modeling of default of
the agency.
Having introduced the modeling framework to handle agency default, we can move
on to the most interesting aspect, the diﬀerent types of agencies. In section 2.4, we
explicitly deﬁne diﬀerent types of agencies with respect to endowment of a guarantee
and general behavior. After the introduction of the diﬀerent types of agencies, we
move on with the numerical results.
2.1 Contractual setup
Let us review the contractual relationship between the mortgagor, the agency, and
the bond investor. In ﬁgure 1, we show the relationships schematically. A mortgagor
has ﬁnanced the purchase of a house of value H by obtaining a loan through the
agency. This loan has been ﬁnanced by selling a bond to an investor. The mortgagor
pays down the loan with a coupon of c. These payments are passed on to the investor,
minus a spread, c − p. In case of prepayment, the agency passes through the face
v a l u eo ft h eb o n dt ot h ei n v e s t o rw h i l ei nc a s eo fd e f a u l t ,t h ea g e n c yr e t a i n st h eh o u s e
of value H, and is obliged to pay face value to the investor.
The focus of this paper is on the obligation of the agency to pay face value to the
investor when the mortgagor defaults. When defaults happen, typically the house
will be worth less than face value so the agency incurs a loss, which is drawn from
the core capital of the agency. Should the amount of losses over time exceed the
level of core capital, the agency technically defaults. That is, of course, unless the
government intervenes.
If the agency actually goes into default, other creditors have no claim to the
mortgage cashﬂows, they belong to the bond investors. This means that the investors
4Figure 1: This ﬁgure illustrates the contractual relationship between the mortgagor,
the agency and the bond investor. The mortgagor pays down the loan with a coupon
of c. These payments are passed on to the investor minus a spread c − p.I nc a s eo f
prepayment, the agency passes through the face value of the bond to the investor. In
case of default, the agency retains the house of value H, but is obliged to pay face
value to the investor.
receive the pure mortgage cashﬂow but are now exposed directly to mortgagor default
risk: if mortgagors default, the bond investors now receive the value of the house
instead of face value as before.
It is this aspect we wish to model and to achieve this, we need to establish a
framework in which mortgagors default and we need to model how this aﬀects the
agency and the investor.
2.2 Basic Model
In this section, we introduce the basic modeling framework. The model we apply
is identical to that of Svenstrup & Willemann (2005), which is in the spirit of the
seminal papers of Kau et al. (1992) and Schwartz & Torous (1992). To keep the focus
on the default of the agency, we only give a brief outline of the framework; details
can be found in Svenstrup & Willemann (2005).
We start by introducing the general risk-neutral framework and the numerical
tool for valuing bonds. We then introduce some notation and look at the speciﬁc
parameterizations of the mortgagor behavior. Finally, we discuss the implementation
of the basic model.
2.2.1 Valuation Methodology
We assume that the economy is characterized by two state variables, the current
house price H and the current short interest rate r. They are assumed to evolve
5according to the following stochastic processes
dH
H
=( α − s)dt + σHdzH (1)
dr = γ (θ − r)dt + σr
√
rdzr (2)
where zH and zr are Brownian motions under the empirical probability measure and
ρ is the instantaneous correlation between these.
These choices of state variables are standard in the literature and go back to
Titman & Torous (1989). The process for the interest rate is a standard Cox, Ingersoll
& Ross (1985) process where the short-term interest rate is assumed to mean revert
with the rate γ to its long-term level θ. Finally, σr is the parameter determining the
volatility of the short rate.
The process for the house price is a standard geometric Brownian motion. With
the usual interpretation, α is the instantaneous return from owning the house and
σH is the instantaneous volatility. We assume that the service ﬂow required to main-
taining the house, which is constant and proportional to H, is paid continuously at
the rate s.
We assume that there is no arbitrage in the economy and we let Q be an equivalent





(1996), the assumption of no arbitrage implies the existence of the measure Q under
which all discounted claims are martingales.
Let us consider a claim X , which is assumed to be a function of the two state
variables X (t)=X (t,H,r). Assuming the absence of arbitrage, we can value the


















where x(r,H,t) is the continuous dividend rate of the claim and X (r,H,T) is the
terminal payment. Applying the Feynman-Kac relationship, see for example Duﬃe
(1996), we get that X must also be a solution to the following two-dimensional partial
diﬀerential equation, PDE















where subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the argument.
Together with a boundary condition on X, equation (3) completely speciﬁes the
value of the claim X.
62.2.2 Notation for the mortgage contract
The characteristics of the mortgage contract, which is assumed to be an annuity, are
deﬁned by
c The continuously compounded coupon paid by the mortgagor, the mortgage rate
p The continuously compounded coupon paid to the investor, the funding rate
i The insurance spread, i = c − p
T The maturity of the bond
C The continuous rate of payment
F (t) The face value of the loan at time t









S (r,t) Present value of the remaining scheduled cash ﬂow
M (r,H,t) Value of the risky mortgage
P (r,H,t) Value of the bond
where H and r are the house price and the short interest rate prevailing at time
t.H e r eS (r,t) is the discounted value of the remaining promised payments if there
are no prepayments or defaults. The discounting is done with respect to the discount
function implied by the process for the short rate in equation (2).
Further, we deﬁne the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio as the ratio of market value of




In the notation of Capozza, Kazarian & Thomson (1998), this is the MCLTV.
However, we choose to limit our notation since we only deal with one type of LTV in
the present context.
2.2.3 Parameterization
We parameterize default, prepayment and non-ﬁnancial termination individually.
7Default We let δ denote the annualized default rate. For H<Mwe use the
speciﬁcation of Schwartz & Torous (1992),
δ(r,H,t)=









for η>0. The parameter η can be set to reﬂect the rate at which mortgagors default.
We have the desired properties: for M = H there is no default and the default rate
is increasing in LTV .N o t et h a tw eo n l ym o d e ld e f a u l ts as being induced by negative
equity in the house. We are thus not able to accommodate defaults caused by the
inability to honor interest payments.
Prepayment To model prepayments, we apply a form of the required gain model
proposed by Jakobsen (1992). For this, deﬁne the gain from prepaying as
G(r,t)=
S (r,t) − F (t)(1+cost)
S (r,t)
where cost is a percentage cost from prepaying. G(r,t) thus compares the value of
a loan issued at par F (t) to the present value of the remaining scheduled cash ﬂow.








where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution truncated
from below at zero.
The speciﬁcation in equation (6) is not complete. Since ˜ π does not depend on
the house value, prepayments will be made irrespective of the value of the house.
One would expect that when there is negative equity in a house (LTV > 1), prepay-
ments are very unlikely and when prepayments do happen, it must be because the
mortgagors in question deplete other sources of wealth when reﬁnancing.
To accommodate this, we augment the prepayment function in equation (6) such
that for LTV above a certain threshold (negative equity) there will be no prepay-
ments, but for ratios lower than this threshold the prepayment rate will be completely
speciﬁed by equation (6).
To achieve this let LTVmax denote the threshold value such that π =0for LTV >






where Ψ is zero for LTV above LTVmax and quickly increase to 1 for decreasing LTV 1.
1Speciﬁcally, we choose Ψ to be the cumulative distribution function of the truncated normal
distribution, truncated from above at LTVmax with a suﬃciently low standard deviation such that
the Ψ function is sharply increasing.
8This means that when the LTV is above LTVmax, there are no prepayments while as
LTV decreases, the prepayment activity approaches the speciﬁcation of equation (6).
Non-ﬁnancial Termination In contrast to Schwartz & Torous (1992) we model
t h er a t eo fn o n - ﬁnancial termination as a separate entity. However, in line with their
model, we use the Public Securities Association’s (PSA) standard prepayment model
as a measure of the rate of non-ﬁnancial termination. In line with Kau et al. (1992) we
assume that mortgagors terminate according to a PSA schedule of 100%. This means
that the rate of non-ﬁnancial termination is assumed to be 6 % yearly after the 30th
month of issuance of the bond. Prior to that, the rate of non-ﬁnancial termination is
assumed to increase linearly from zero at origination.
Termination of this kind occurs at any time and at any combination of house price
and interest rate. Therefore, it is important to consider what is expected to happen
when a mortgagor decides to terminate the loan prematurely. In line with Kau et al.
(1992), we assume that mortgagors decide to prepay or default according to what is
cheapest. In default, the house of value H is lost while the cost in prepayment is
F · (1 + cost).T h u s ,f o rH<F· (1 + cost) the mortgagor defaults on the loan and
for H>F· (1 + cost) the mortgagor prepays the loan.
2.2.4 Implementation
Essentially, with equation (3) all that needs to be speciﬁed are the functions x(r,H,t)
and X (r,H,T). That is, the payout rate of the asset and the terminal condition. We
h a v et h r e es e p a r a t ee n t i t i e sw ew i s ht ov a l u ew i t ht h eP D E :t h em o r t g a g ev a l u e( M),
the bond (P)a n dﬁnally the scheduled cash ﬂow (S).
Since the loan is fully amortized, the terminal conditions are
M (r,H,T)=P (r,H,T)=S (r,H,T)=0
The continuous payout rates, however, diﬀer signiﬁcantly. They are identical to
those of Schwartz & Torous (1992), and we introduce each in turn.
For the mortgage we have
xM (r,H,t)=C +π(r,H,t)[F (t) − M (r,H,t)]+δ(r,H,t)[H (t) − M (r,H,t)] (7)
The change in the value of M is caused ﬁrst by the continuous payment C.T h e
loan is prepaid at the rate π where the agency loses the mortgage and instead receives
the face value F. The loan is defaulted on with the rate δ where the agency again
loses the mortgage but retains the house at value H (t).
Further, for the bond
xP (r,H,t)=C − F (t)(c − p)+[ δ(r,H,t)+π(r,H,t)][F (t) − P (r,H,t)] (8)
9The payment C is made, but the investor only gets the interest p,a n dt h ed i f -
ference i = c − p is retained by the agency. Because of the default insurance, the
investor receives the face value in case of either default or prepayment.
Finally, the scheduled payments of the mortgagor is an annuity, and we have the
following simple payout rate
xS (r,H,t)=C
With the speciﬁcation of the payout rates, we can solve the PDE in equation (3)
using an Alternate Diﬀerence Implicit (ADI) scheme. Note that the three claims
have to be valued simultaneously since they are interdependent due to the mutual
dependence on the prepayment and default rates, which in turn depend on the value
of the mortgage and the scheduled cash ﬂow.
2.3 Defaults of Agencies
In this section, we discuss how we can model the default of agencies. In section 2.3.1,
we discuss the general method and provide intuition, while section 2.3.2 contains the
speciﬁc implementation.
2.3.1 The general method
The focus of this paper is on the default risk of agencies in various settings. As
explained in section 2.1, agencies are exposed to default risk through the issuance of
guaranteed bonds. In the case of default of a mortgagor, the agency is contractually
obliged to pay the face value to the investor and sell the collateral of the mortgage,
the house. Typically, this results in a ﬁnancial loss of the agency. For this type of
losses, the agency carries core capital, which is used to ﬁll the gap between the sold
house and the promised face value. In the case of a wave of defaults of mortgagors,
it could happen that the agency loses its core capital and therefore goes into default.
A tt h ec o r eo ft h ed e f a u l te v e n to ft h ea g e n c yi st h el e v e lo faccumulated loss.I t
is not the current level of loss alone, which can trigger a default, it is the history
of default events of mortgagors that are important. As such, the accumulated loss
is path-dependent. This means that at a given point in the future in the numerical
solution, we cannot determine the level of accumulated losses without knowing the
entire mortgage default history up until now. This in turn depends on the develop-
ment of interest rates and house prices up until that time. For example, suppose the
house price is 120 today. If we in 5 years know that the value of the house is 140, it
is important for the assumed accumulated losses if the house price within the 5 years
has been at 90 or 140.
The task, however, is not impossible since we can use the so-called augmented state
variable approach from Hull & White (1993) and Svenstrup (2002). The augmented
state variable approach seeks to circumvent the path-dependency by introducing an-
other state variable, in addition to the short interest rate and house price. This
10state variable denotes, for example, the level of accumulated losses. Thus, for each
combination of house price, interest rate and potential level of accumulated loss, we
can calculate the value of the bond. All we then have to do is to keep track of how
the current loss for a given level of accumulated loss translates into a new level of
accumulated loss, and then look up the pre-calculated value of a bond with this level
of loss. In technical terms, this is the update step of the algorithm.
Figure 2: This ﬁgure illustrates the update step of the ﬁnite diﬀence solution. We
operate with 4 levels of accumulated losses which we call A, B, C and D. Within
the ﬁnite diﬀerence solution we know the future values of the bond for all potential
levels of losses, and we want to calculate the current value of the bond at each level
of potential loss. Suppose that the current level of accumulated loss i B. Knowing the
accumulated and the current loss, we can calculate the new accumulated loss, which
is somewhere betwen B and C.
W ei l l u s t r a t et h eu p d a t es t e pi nﬁgure 2, where we have ﬁx e dac o m b i n a t i o no f
interest rate and house price. This implies that we have also ﬁxed a level of loss at
that particular point in time through the default speciﬁcation in equation (5). We
operate with 4 levels of accumulated losses, which we call A, B, C and D. Here, D is
the level of loss, which triggers default and A is 0 losses. Within the ﬁnite diﬀerence
solution, we know the future values of the bond for all potential levels of losses, and
we want to calculate the current value of the bond at each level of potential loss.
Suppose that the current level of accumulated loss is B. Knowing the accumulated
and the current loss we can calculate the new accumulated loss, which is somewhere
between B and C. This means that the value of the bond now is equal to an average
of future bond values where the accumulated losses are B and C respectively. We
can proceed in this fashion and calculate the current value of the bond for any given
level of accumulated loss and combination of house price and interest rate. Applying
the PDE in equation to this system, we can move the solution one step backwards in
t i m e ,w h e r et h ev a l u e sw ej u s tc a l c u l a t e dn o we n t e ra st h ef u t u r ev a l u e si nﬁgure 2.
11Ultimately, we arrive at time 0, today, with values of bonds for all combinations
of current interest rates, house prices and levels of loss and we simply pick the value
corresponding to our empirical assumptions.
2.3.2 The speciﬁc implementation
Even if the notion of a state variable as the level of accumulated losses is intuitive,
it turns out that it is not appropriate. In the calculation, we value a bond of say
100 USD of face value, which is fully amortized. Focusing on accumulated losses
and assuming that the agency defaults once the losses exceed the initial level of
core capital, we really assume that the agency issues a bond today and then does
not participate in the bond market anymore. This means that we do not see the
agency as an ongoing concern. Furthermore, there is virtually no chance of an agency
defaulting if the agency is keeping the initial level of core capital when only 50% of
face value remains, and this is always a very unrealistic behavior.
There are a number of speciﬁcations, which allow for a more realistic modeling
of the behavior of the agency. We choose to settle with deﬁning the state variable
as the percentage of face value, which can be lost before default. In the following, we
r e f e rt ot h i sa st h el e v e lo fsustainable losses and we denote it L. The states of L are
discretized as {Ln}n=1..K where LK =0 , signifying default, and L1 is the initial value
at origination.
At the outset, core capital constitutes 2.5% of face value, say. Given a loss due
to mortgage default, this level is decreased while if there are no defaults, the level of
core capital is eﬀectively decreased but kept at a minimum of the initial 2.5%. This
feature also directly accommodates the realistic behavior that the agency replenishes
core capital: if there has been a high level of losses in the past followed by a period
of few losses, the core capital is increased. Additionally, this line of thought is more
in the spirit of seeing the agency as a ’going concern’ where we assume indirectly
that the agency has other businesses starting up at the same time as the debt in the
focused mortgage is paid down.
Furthermore, we assume that the core capital is invested in low risk assets, and
therefore earn the short risk-free interest rate. We further assume that the insurance
spread i is also used to replenish the core capital in states where it is below the initial
level.
An additional detail concerns the functional implementation of default provisions.
Using the augmented state variable approach, we have the value of the bond for all
combinations of interest rates and house prices for each level sustainable loss. To
impose default provisions, we simple set the value for the level of LK according to
what the provisions state. For example, suppose the provisions stated that in the
event of default the investor would demand accelerated payments from the mortgagor.
T h e nt h ev a l u eo ft h ec l a i m ,f o rt h el e v e lo fLK and for all levels of house prices and
interest rates, is simply set equal to the remaining face value F. Subsequently, by
12using the update step outlined in the prior section, the value of the bond for diﬀerent
levels of sustainable losses at earlier times will depend on the acceleration of payments
imposed in default.
In the discussion above, we have loosely used the term ’bond’, but of course, both
the mortgage and the bond can be modeled in this way, taking into account various
provisions in the event of default.
With the details concerning the exact modeling techniques in place, we move on
with deﬁning diﬀerent types of agencies.
2.4 Types of Agencies
We work with three types of agencies. We summarize these agencies in table 1 and
we discuss each in turn.
At a superﬁcial level, we model one agency as having a guarantee from the gov-
ernment and not utilizing it. An alternative agency has a guarantee and uses it fully.
Another agency we model as being without a guarantee and acting accordingly. Com-
paring the lending and borrowing rates, which surface from these agencies, allows us
to gauge a potential funding advantage and the eﬀect on mortgage rates.
Abbreviation GSE AGSE NGSE
Name Standard GSE (Agency theory) GSE Non GSE





Mortgage B a s e do nt r u ed e f a u l t
risk
Takes into account
limit to own losses
Takes into account de-
preciation in default
Bond Secured cashﬂow Secured cashﬂow Default risky cashﬂow
T a b l e1 :T h i st a b l ep r o v i d e sas u m m a r yo ft h et h r e et y p e so fa g e n c i e sw ee x a m i n e .
The agency abbreviated GSE is the base case agency: mortgage and bond is valued
in the same was as in Svenstrup & Willemann (2005). The US government guarantees
all payments such that the GSE can never default. The investors acknowledge this
and value the cashﬂow as being fully secured. Additionally, the GSE does not seek to
exploit the guarantee from the US government, but values the mortgage taking into
account all default risk of the mortgage pool. That is, the GSE does not take into
account the fact that the government guarantee induces a cap on the level of losses
for the GSE.
The agency abbreviated AGSE has, like the GSE, a full guarantee from the US
government. Thus, investors value the bonds as being without default risk. However,
this agency takes into account the guarantee from the government: should the core
capital be depleted, the agency knows the government will intervene and therefore
suﬀers no more losses. Put in another way, the agency values the mortgage cashﬂow,
13taking into account that should many defaults occur, the agency will only pay for the
losses up until the level of core capital. With the augmented state variable approach
outlined in the prior section, we modify the cashﬂow from the mortgage in equation
(7) such that for the level of the state variable signifying default, mortgagor default
payments are no longer incurred. Speciﬁcally, let n denote the current level of the





C + π(r,H,t)[F (t) − M (r,H,t)]
+δ(r,H,t)[H (t) − M (r,H,t)] if n < K
C + π(r,H,t)[F (t) − M (r,H,t)] if n = K
This means that if the agency cannot sustain more losses, the cashﬂow from the
mortgage is seen as being without default risk (δ =0 ) as the government incurs these
losses. Through the augmented state variable approach, this aﬀects the time-zero
value of the mortgage as there is a probability that losses due to default will become
high and this removes the default liability of the agency.
As a direct opposite to the AGSE, we introduce the NGSE. This agency does
not carry any guarantee from the US government, and investors value bonds accord-
ingly. We assume that in the event of agency default, the investor receives the pure
mortgage cashﬂow. However, because the investors do not have the machinery to
collect coupon payments and handle prepayments and defaults, it is likely that the
mortgage cashﬂows will be sold oﬀ immediately. A realistic scenario appears to be
that the cashﬂows will be sold at a discount of maybe 5% or 10%. We can model this
agency default provision simply by modifying the value of the bond at the upper level
of the state variable for sustainable losses. In addition to the valuation of the bond
where we take into account the default risk, we also assume that the agency values
the mortgage, taking into account the value in default. Speciﬁcally, we assume that
the agency values the mortgage, taking into account that should the agency default,
the cashﬂow will be worth less. To accommodate this, we do not modify the payout
r a t i oa sa b o v e ,b u tw em o d i f yt h ev a l u e st h e m s e l v e sa s
XM (r,H,K,t)=( 1 − ω)X ˜ M (r,H,t)
XP (r,H,K,t)=( 1 − ω)X ˜ M (r,H,t)
Here, ˜ M is a mortgage, which does not carry agency default risk, and ω is the loss
in default. The value of the mortgage and bond in default should be set equal to an
agency-default free mortgage since after the agency defaults we are interested in the
pure mortgage cashﬂo w .N o t et h a tw en o wh a v et ov a l u ea l s ot h e ˜ M mortgage, and
we need to keep track of the value of both mortgage and bond for all potential levels
of sustainable losses through time.
With the description of the diﬀerent types of agencies in place, we move on with
t h en u m e r i c a lr e s u l t sw h e r ew ec o m p a r el o a n so ﬀered by the agencies.
143R e s u l t s
In this section, we present the numerical results of the model. We start with intro-
ducing the empirical setup in section 3.1 and we perform the analysis itself in section
3.2.
3.1 Empirical Setup
For ease of overview, all parameter values along with a short explanation are given
in table 2. The default rate η and the parameters of the house price process are
taken from the speciﬁcation of Schwartz & Torous (1992) while the interest rate
parameters are taken from Downing, Stanton & Wallace (2001). The mean and
standard deviation of the required gain are admittedly ad hoc but chosen to give an
annualized prepayment rate of 10% for a prepayment gain of 10% and a prepayment
rate of 26% for a prepayment gain of 20%. We assume that the short rate starts at
its long-term level, r0 =0 .0574. In line with Capozza et al. (1998), we assume that
i n n o v a t i o n st oi n t e r e s tr a t e sa n dh o u s ep r i c e sa r eu n c o r r e l a t e d .
For the augmented state variable approach, we need K = 100 levels of the sustain-
able loss in order to yield precise solutions. This is normal, see for example Svenstrup
(2002). Finally, we assume that for the NGSE agency described above ω =5 %of the
mortgage value will be lost to the investor in the case of agency default.
We choose to work with an initial level of core capital of 2.5%. This value is based
on Fannie Mae 10-K (2003) where the outstanding guaranteed mortgage face value
is USD 1.423 trillion and core capital is 34.4 billion. This translates into USD 2.4
per USD 100 of face value. According to Frame & White (2004), the Secretary of the
Federal Reserve has the authority to purchase for USD 2.24 billion of securities of
F&F. Counting this as a ’line of credit’, assuming a core capital of 2.5% of outstanding
face value appears reasonable.
L e tu sd i s c u s st h en u m e r i c a la n a l y s i s .G r a n t e d ,d e p a r t i n gf r o mt h eb a s ec a s eG S E
and assuming e.g. defaultability of the agency, prices will move around. The change
in value of the mortgage aﬀects the amount the mortgagor needs to borrow, which in
turn increases the payments and the likelihood of default. To simplify the analysis,
we turn instead to par rates. This has been done in Schwartz & Torous (1992) and
for an identical model in Svenstrup & Willemann (2005).
For a given type of agency, the par rate c∗ is the coupon rate that the mortgagor
has to pay in order for the loan to be issued at par. The par rate p∗ is the coupon
rate the agency has to promise the investors for the value of the bond to be issued at
par. To ﬁnd these par rates we solve the equations
F = M (r,H,T,c
∗,p
∗)
F = P (r,H,T,c
∗,p
∗)
We do this using a two-dimensional Newton-Raphson approach, see for example
15Parameter
Name Value Explanation
T 30 Maturity of loan
γ 0.13131 Mean reversion rate of interest rate process
θ 0.05740 Long-term level of interest rate process
σr 0.06035 Volatility of interest rate process
λ -0.07577 Market price of interest rate risk
s 0.065 Service ﬂow required to maintain house
σH 0.10 House return volatility
ρ 0 Correlation between interest and house return processes
η 4.58 D e f a u l tr a t ep a r a m e t e r
µgain 0.3 Mean required gain of prepayment model
σgain 0.2 Standard deviation of the prepayment model
cost 2% Cost of using prepayment option
LTVMax 120% U p p e rl i m i tf o rp r e p a y m e n t
K 100 Number of artiﬁcial state levels for sustainable losses
S1 2.5% Initial core capital as percentage of face value
ω 5% Percentage loss for investor in case of agency default
Table 2: This table summarizes the parameters used throughout the analysis of the
paper.
Press, Flannery, Teukolsky & Vetterling (1989). For a given short rate and house
p r i c ew en o wh a v et h ec o u p o nr a t et oc h a r g et h em o r t g a g o ra n dt h ec o u p o nr a t et o
oﬀer the investor so that both assets trade at par. Throughout, we work with a face
value of F =1 0 0 .
3.2 Analysis
In this section, we perform the analysis itself. We start with discussing how par
mortgage and bond rates change in response to changes in LTV and agency behavior.
This enables us to gain some intuition concerning the eﬀects of government guaran-
tees. We then move on with gauging a potential funding advantage and how this can
beneﬁt mortgagors within our framework. We end the section with discussing how a
government guarantee in itself can induce a stabilized mortgage market.
Table 3 shows par mortgage rates c∗,c o u p o nr a t e sp∗ and insurance spreads i∗ for
the base case GSE, the AGSE and the NGSE. We vary the initial house price from
H =1 0 0to 150 with everything else ﬁxed at the base case values of table 2.
Let us start with gaining some intuition on how the par mortgage and coupon
rates move in response to changing house prices. Focusing ﬁrst on the GSE, we ﬁnd,
unsurprisingly, that the par mortgage rate decreases as the value of the mortgaged
house increases. This is because the mortgage carries less default risk to the agency
16H GSE AGSE NGSE
c∗ i∗ p∗ c∗ i∗ p∗ c∗ i∗ p∗
100 8.10 0.758 7.34 7.46 0.141 7.32 8.36 0.260 8.10
110 7.71 0.366 7.35 7.39 0.071 7.32 7.83 0.113 7.72
120 7.54 0.195 7.34 7.36 0.036 7.32 7.60 0.058 7.54
130 7.45 0.110 7.34 7.34 0.019 7.32 7.48 0.032 7.45
140 7.40 0.065 7.33 7.34 0.010 7.33 7.42 0.019 7.40
150 7.37 0.039 7.33 7.33 0.005 7.33 7.38 0.011 7.37
Table 3: For varying levels of the initial house price, this table shows par mortgage
rates c∗, coupon rates p∗ and insurance spreads i∗ for the base case GSE, the AGSE
and the NGSE. Everything else is ﬁxed at the base case values of table 2.
since the collateral is worth more relative to the size of the loan, ﬁxed at F =1 0 0 .
At the same time, the insurance spread also decreases such that the agency retains
a smaller fraction of the coupon payments as compensation for default risk. For a
house price of 120, an LTV of approximately 83%, we ﬁnd that the par insurance
spread is 19.5 bp. This value is very close to the estimate of the real world insurance
spread of 19 bp found in Jaﬀee (2003). Thus, at the outset our model appears to yield
reasonable result. At the same time as mortgage rates change, the coupon rate p∗
is relatively constant. This is because the bond is without default risk and therefore
collateralization only has a marginal eﬀect, causing slightly diﬀerent prepayment
proﬁles.
For the AGSE we ﬁnd the same pattern even though at diﬀerent levels: Par
mortgage rates and insurance spreads drop when the value of the mortgaged house
increases while the par coupon rate is very stable across levels of collateralization.
For the NGSE we also have that par mortgage rates and insurance spreads drop
when the value of the mortgage house increases. However, we also see that the
par coupon rates decrease. This is because the bond itself has credit risk, because
the agency does not carry a guarantee. Therefore, the required promised payment
from the investor decreases when the loan becomes more secure such that defaults of
mortgagors, and ultimately the agency, become less likely.
Having brieﬂy examined the relative changes, we can conclude that the model
behaves in an intuitive fashion. Let us now move on with focusing on speciﬁc details.
W ef o c u so nah o u s ew o r t h120 that corresponds to an LTV of 83%, which is close to
the maximum LTV allowable at origination.
L e tu sf o c u so nt h ec h a n g ei nt h ef u n d i n gr a t ep∗ from the AGSE to the NGSE.
This measures the direct diﬀerence to the investor between buying bonds with no
guarantee and buying bonds with a guarantee. We ﬁnd that the AGSE has a funding
advantage of 22 bp compared to the NGSE. The GSE has a funding advantage relative
to the NGSE of 20 bp. The diﬀerence for the GSE and the AGSE is due to the way
the mortgage rate c aﬀects the payments to the investor, see equations (4) and (8).
17As an average between the two agencies, we have the ﬁrst ﬁnding: The direct eﬀect
from having a government guarantee as modeled in this paper results in a funding
advantage of 21 bp.
This is lower than the generally accepted level of 30 to 40 bp found in Passmore
(2003), CBO (2001) and Blinder et al. (2004), but the 21 bp we ﬁnd are from the
pure eﬀect of the guarantee: As described in Frame & White (2004), the GSEs have
other beneﬁts which can increase the funding advantage: securities issued by F&F
can serve as collateral for public deposits, they can be used by the Fed in open-
market operations and federally insured depositary institutions are not limited in
their investment in F&F securities. These aspects are not captured in the present
framework. The funding advantage we ﬁnd is the diﬀerence between funding rates
for an agency, which is regarded as being without any default risk (GSE and AGSE),
and an agency where there is certainty that there will be no government intervention,
t h eN G S E .T h ef u n d i n ga d v a n t a g ew ec a l c u l a t ec a nt h u sb e e ns e e na sa nu p p e rl i m i t
on how much of the real world funding advantage can be attributed to the guarantee
itself. If one is willing to take the 40 bp funding advantage found in Passmore (2003)
as given, it means that roughly 50% of the funding advantage stems from other aspects
of the GSE than the guarantee. This further implies that when the entire funding
advantage is used as a proxy for the dollar value of the liability as in Frame & White
(2004), this estimate may be severely overestimated.
Having examined the funding advantage within the model, we now move on to
interpreting the eﬀect on mortgage rates. For this, we focus ﬁrst on the AGSE where
all beneﬁts from the guarantee are passed through. For the GSE on the other hand,
no beneﬁts are passed through. Focusing on the insurance spread required by the
two agencies provides an alternative way to view the use of the guarantee. From this
comparison, we can calculate how much of the funding advantage the GSE retains,
and we relate this to empirical ﬁndings.
The AGSE only considers its own losses when valuing the mortgage. That is,
just like the investors acknowledge that there is no credit risk in the bonds, this
agency acknowledges that there is an upper limit to the amount of losses it will
have to sustain. This causes it to lower mortgage rates such that the beneﬁts of
the guarantee are p a s s e dt h r o u g ht ot h em o r t g a g o r s : the agency uses the guarantee
to set the par mortgage rate. In our case, this lowers the mortgage rate by 18 bp
compared to the base case GSE. Within our model, this is the maximum change in the
mortgage rate, which can be achieved. This also provides a theoretical explanation
for the relationship between a funding advantage and beneﬁt to the mortgagor: if the
agency sets mortgage rates to compensate for its own losses only, the guarantee from
the government will have a direct beneﬁt for the mortgagors.
T u r n i n gt ot h eG S E ,w es e et h a te v e ni ft h i st y p eo fa g e n c yh a sag u a r a n t e e ,t h e
mortgage rates are not aﬀected by this. However, since it has a guarantee, it should
only require compensation for its own potential losses. The compensation for its own
losses is that of the AGSE: an insurance spread of 4 bp. Nevertheless, according to
18table 3, the GSE retains 20 bp. Since the risk borne by the GSE is only worth 4
bp, it means that it earns 16 bp. Thus, the guarantee for the GSE does not beneﬁt
mortgagors, so whom does it beneﬁt ?T h ea n s w e ri st h es h a r e h o l d e r s .
We now have two ways to view the eﬀect from the funding advantage: A lowered
mortgage rate or an unnecessary retained insurance spread. As an average between
the two, we ﬁnd that if the agency with a guarantee does not change mortgage rates
in response to a funding advantage, 17 bp of the funding advantage is not passed
through to mortgagors. This corresponds to retaining 76% of the advantage, which
goes directly to shareholders.
H o wd o e st h i sc o m p a r et ot h ee m p i r i c a lﬁndings? We believe the most realistic
eﬀe c to nt h em o r t g a g ei sf r o mB l i n d e re ta l .( 2 0 0 4 )w h e r ei ti sf o u n dt ob e1 9b p .I f
the funding advantage is between 30 and 40 bp and the beneﬁt to the mortgagors is
19 bp, it means that the ’real world’ GSE retains between 37 and 53% of the beneﬁt.
Comparing the theoretical level of 76% here to the empirical range of 37% to 53%, we
can thus conclude that the real-world GSEs have a behavior somewhere in between
the GSE and AGSE types, such that mortgage rates are changed somewhat in the
light of a funding advantage.
As commented on in Frame & White (2004), several authors including Peek &
Wilcox (2003) argue that the GSEs such as F&F enhance the stability of the mortgage
market in the sense that they are able to reduce interest rate volatility through a
general pro-cyclical behavior. We now show that within our framework, we can
accommodate this through the pure presence of a guarantee of the government. In
this context, we narrowly deﬁne stability as mortgage rates, which are less sensitive
to changes in house price volatility than otherwise. To illustrate this, consider table
4 showing par mortgage rates and insurance spreads for the three types of agencies
for varying levels of house price volatility, σH.T h eb a s ev a l u ef o rσH is 10% and we
f o c u so na ni n i t i a lh o u s ep r i c eo fH =1 2 0 . For the par mortgage rates, the eﬀect
from changing the house price volatility is clearer when presented graphically. For
this, we include ﬁgure 3.
c∗ i∗
5% 10% 20% 5% 10% 20%
GSE 7.34% 7.54% 8.47% 0.025% 0.195% 1.138%
AGSE 7.32% 7.36% 7.50% 0.000% 0.036% 0.214%
NGSE 7.36% 7.60% 8.67% 0.009% 0.058% 0.217%
Table 4: This table shows par mortgage rates and insurance spreads for the three
types of agencies for varying levels of house price volatility, sH.T h eb a s ev a l u ef o r
sH is 10% and we focus an initial house price of H =1 2 0 .
The base case is the agency of type GSE where the required mortgage rate in-
creases sharply when house price volatility goes up. This is because the increased
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Figure 3: This ﬁgure shows par mortgage rates for varying levels of house-price
volatility for the three types of agencies. We focus on a house with value H =1 2 0
and a face value F =1 0 0 .
the mortgages. For this, the GSE requires compensation and mortgage rates thus
increase. For the NGSE we also ﬁnd an increasing mortgage rate, which increases
faster than the case of the GSE. The lack of guarantee from the US government makes
agency defaults more likely through the increased mortgagor-default likelihood. This
decreases the value of the mortgage such that a higher mortgage rate needs to be set
for the loan to trade at par.
Turning our attention to the AGSE instead, we see that the mortgage rates are
remarkably stable. This is because the mortgage rate is set only to reﬂect the default
risk up until the level of core capital. The chance of losses increases of course, and
we see that the mortgage rates increase. However, due to the guarantee by the
government, they increase far less.
Thus, within our framework we are able to create a link between a government
g u a r a n t e ea n das t a b l em o r t g a g em a r k e t . O n ec o u l ds a yt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n ti n d i -
r e c t l yp a y s ,v i at h eg u a r a n t e e ,t h eA G S Ea g e n c yt op r o v i d es t a b l em o r t g a g er a t e s
even if the uncertainty regarding the value of the collateral has increased. Further,
even if the government has the same risk in relation to the GSE type agency, the
GSE mortgage rates are only marginally more stable than the NGSE. Thus, it is only
if the agency truly acknowledges the limits to its own losses, that a guarantee can
20provide a stable mortgage market.
Our ﬁndings above obviously have to be interpreted taking into account the mod-
eling framework. As discussed earlier, we only model the direct eﬀects from the
government guarantee: other aspects of the relationship as described in Frame &
White (2004) will increase the funding advantage. Within the model, the govern-
ment only intervenes at the default boundary of the ﬁrm. However, it may very well
be the case that the GSE would be put under observation or get cash infusions as it
drifts towards the default boundary. Most likely, this will increase the mortgage rate
of the AGSE and thereby reduce the potential beneﬁt of the guarantee as modeled
here.
All conclusions have been based on a 5% loss to the investor in case of default of
an agency. If the loss was higher, 10% say, the funding advantage would increase to
28 bp. Out of this 28 bp, the GSE would retain 16 bp out of the insurance spread of
20 bp such that the GSE would now retain roughly 57% of the funding advantage.
This is actually more in line with the empirical estimates of Passmore (2003), CBO
(2001) and Blinder et al. (2004).
An additional aspect is the sensitivity of our conclusions to the assumed parameter
values as shown in table 2. As we have seen above, changes in the house-price volatility
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on par mortgage and coupon rates, and evidently changes
in other parameters will have an eﬀect as well. Of particular interest in the present
context is the sensitivity towards the default activity, in our setup condensed in the
parameter η in equation (5). However, Svenstrup & Willemann (2005) ﬁnd that
for an identical model, conclusions regarding changes in par insurance spreads are
largely insensitive to reasonable changes in η. W ee x p e c tt h i st oc a r r yo v e rt ot h e
present analysis. Obviously, a sensitivity analysis of all involved parameters could be
performed but we deem that this is beyond the scope of this analysis.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In the analysis in the prior section, we examined the potential size of a GSE funding
advantage and to what extent this can aﬀect mortgagors. We ﬁnd that the direct
eﬀect from having a government guarantee can result in a funding advantage of up
to 21 bp. This is signiﬁcantly lower than the empirical estimates of 30-40 bp and
indicates that the true funding advantage is not only driven by the credit quality of
GSE bonds.
We model a type of GSE, AGSE, which takes into account the guarantee when
setting mortgage rates. For this agency, the funding advantage is passed through in
full to the mortgagors. Comparing this to a case of an agency, which does not alter
its mortgage rates, we ﬁnd that if an agency with a guarantee does not set mortgage
rates accordingly, then the shareholders retain as much as 75% of the funding ad-
vantage. Empirical estimates of this are in the range of 37% to 53%, indicating that
21the behavior of real world GSEs is somewhere in between the two extreme types of
agencies introduced here.
We further ﬁnd that a government guarantee can have a stabilizing eﬀect on the
mortgage market. If the GSE takes into account the government guarantee when
setting mortgage rates, the rates exhibit less sensitivity to changes in house price
volatility. Simply having the guarantee only has a weak stabilizing eﬀect compared
to an agency with no guarantee.
Throughout the paper, we have only focused on one business line of the GSEs:
mortgage securitization. However, according to Jaﬀee (2003), F&F generated roughly
75% of its proﬁt in 2001 from interest earned on retained portfolios. That is, the
largest fraction of the proﬁt is created by investing in mortgage backed securities
funded by issuing regular corporate debt, which in itself has a funding advantage. We
do not capture this aspect and it could be interesting to incorporate this in a further
analysis of the true liability of the government. However, this is a complicated issue
since F&F hedge their interest rate risk and generally must be expected to have a
superior knowledge regarding the mortgage backed bonds. Therefore, this question
is relegated to potential areas of future research.
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